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Abstract. Analysis of farmers' attitudes and potential and 
predicted responses to cost-sharing incentives is key to prospective 
adoption of such a program on a wider scale. A pre-project survey 
of potential participants in the Gum Creek Watershed, and an 
economic evaluation of management alternatives found that 
voluntary participation improved with higher cost-sharing rates. 
However, nitrogen runoff leaching effects were limited. Biophysical 
simulation and mathematical programming indicate that profit-
enhancing changes in supplemental irrigation management cause 
little or no added impact on water quality. Decreasing the nitrogen 
applications from currently advised rates has limited abatement 
potential because it sharply decreases farmers' expected net returns 
and voluntary participation. This analytical framework provides 
critical decision-making information on the economic and 
environmental tradeoffs and burdens under variations of program 
implementation. The analytical framework can be applied to other 
agricultural areas for prospective pollution abatement policies with 
regard to the same or other agricultural practices. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Gum Creek Watershed (GCW) comprises approximately 
21,200 ha in the Coastal Plain of Georgia. A state nonpoint 
assessment report and nonpoint source management plan identified 
Gum Creek as an agricultural stream likely to be threatened by 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution, and the watershed was 
subsequently selected as one of 16 water quality demonstration 
projects nationwide in which to examine potentially polluting 
agricultural practices (GCES, 1992b). Georgia legislation protects 
the "public interest" for "beneficial use" of riparian water resources 
(Wright, 1984, p. 20) while establishing a class of "high value" users 
of water resources with non-riparian rights (Smith, 1978). 
Traditional riparian property rights, however, may require that the 
public share farmers' costs for nonpoint source pollution abatement. 
The GCW project aspires to reduce potential nonpoint source 
pollution by inducing farmers to voluntarily adopt "best management 
practices" (BMPs) within a federal cost-sharing pilot program 
(GCES, 1992b). This paper reports a study which evaluates the 
potential for voluntary - adoption of BMP alternatives by assuming, 
prior to the implementation of the project, that the federal 
government would share a portion of the production opportunity 
costs of abatement with participating farmers. The analytical 
framework is introduced next, followed by the results of simulations 
and predicted responses to varying government payments. 
Conclusions to the analysis incorporate policy implications based on 
the Gum Creek case. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The objective of this study was to develop an analytical 
framework and assess potential chemical and irrigation 
management practices which could reduce ground and surface 
water pollution while retaining farmer profitability under a 
public/private cost-share program. Figure 1 presents the schematic 
of the analytical framework which we developed. The analytical 
approach integrated (a) peanut and corn crop growth simulation 
models, (b) a soil/water simulation model, (c) estimation of 
expectations of farmers' net returns and pollution levels associated 
with alternative management practices, and (d) mathematical 
programming to evaluate nitrogen and irrigation management for 
an area-representative, profit-maximizing farm. 
Chemical and irrigation management practices can be altered to 
reduce soil erosion and nitrogen nonpoint pollution resulting from 
crop production. These two management practices embody the 
primary BMPs contracted in the GCW project and form the basis 
of the scenarios evaluated. Economic modeling of agricultural 
production in the GCW started from the assumption of 
maximization of farmers' expected net returns to the land when 
agricultural source pollution is restricted to allowable levels under 
current production technology conditions (Sun, 1994; Griffin and 
Bromley, 1982). Abatement from current practices would be 
compensated partially by government lump-sum subsidies to 
farmers. 
Three locally-validated, biophysical simulators were linked and 
utilized to obtain crop yields and pollution output. Simulated 
output was used to overcome the problem of missing measurements 
of water quality data. We simulated and predicted peanut crop 
development, water and nitrogen balance, and the final peanut yield 
using PEANUTGRO version 1.02 (Boote et al. 1989), a process-
oriented peanut crop growth model. CERES-Maize version 2.10 
(Ritchie et al. 1992) simulated the growth and yield of corn, 
produced in rotation with peanuts. GLEAMS version 2.0 (Knisel 
et al. 1992) simulated the physical movement of agricultural 
chemicals within and through the plant root zone and produced the 
chemical pollution and soil erosion output levels, given crop 
growth parameters, agricultural management systems, and other 
physical data. 
Simulations of Irrigation Application Alternatives 
Peanuts, cotton, pecans, pasture, melons, and corn constitute the 
major crop activities in the watershed. Using information gathered 
from individual farmer surveys (GCES 1992a), our crop and 
nitrogen runoff/leaching simulations considered site-specific 
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Figure 1 Data Flow in Modeling Best Management Practices 
northwestern section of the watershed as a representative farm type 
and site. Because long-term simulations are important for 
incorporating weather (Thomas et al. 1990) and market risk into the 
analysis, 17 years' (1975-1991) daily observations of Tifton weather 
data were used in the simulations. Tifton loamy sand with an 
average 3% slope represented the soil characteristics used in the 
simulations (Knisel et al., 1991; Thomas et al., 1990). 
Design Conditions 
We modelled peanuts rotated annually with corn, representing the 
mix of other crops for this area. Only corn production employs 
nitrogen fertilizer applications, and other chemical applications, 
including phosphate and potash fertilizers and the use of pesticides, 
were assumed at optimal rates for the crop growth conditions. 
Approximately 25% of the cropping land currently receives 
supplementary irrigation. In the simulations, supplemental irrigation 
was triggered each time in the growing season when water content 
in the soil (at 50 cm in depth) was detected to drop to specified 
percentages. 
Previous ten-year (1982-1991) peanut and corn yields of Crisp 
County (in the GCW) were used as observed data for comparison 
and validation of the simulated crop yields. Initial soil conditions 
were appropriately adjusted to modify the simulated yields until they 
closely matched the observed yields (Hook, 1991). 
Management Alternatives 
Base model simulations used no irrigation and a rate of 81.7 kg/ha 
of nitrogen (N) fertilizer (GCES, 1992a). Validated base models 
were then extended to generate predicted annual crop yields and N  
emissions under current (baseline) andalternative nitrogen fertilizer 
application and supplementary irrigation management practices. 
Farmers' net returns were calculated using corresponding market-
year price data. As the irrigated growth parameters demonstrated 
nonlinear relationships (Sun, 1994), we used quadratic 
programming (QP) to search for economically optimal management 
practices (BMPs). 
Estimation of Objective and Constraint Functions 
In a voluntarily adopted cost-share program, fanners' attitudes 
toward adoption of the program will determine their expected net 
returns and the expected pollution levels, as well as the expected 
government expenditures on the cost-sharing program. The 
incentive program in this case was assumed to be based on a lump-
sum sharing of the farmer's reduction of net returns (opportunity 
costs) by adopting the new alternative. Then the expectations of 
the area-wide, representative GCW net returns (ENR), soil losses 
(ESL), nitrogen losses by runoff (ENF), and nitrogen losses by 
leaching (ENL) sum both voluntary adoption and non-adoption 
possibilities. For example, let a farmer's probability of adopting 
current management be (1-p), with net return R 0. That same 
farmer's probability of adopting the new management practices is 
p, with net return R, plus the government cost-sharing payment, 
AR k. The summation of both possibilities, (1-p)12 0 + p(R, + ARk), 
then represents the GCW farmer's ENR. Expected pollution levels 
likewise sum outcomes of each alternative multiplied by its 
respective probability. 
Information on farmers' willingness-to-accept payments for 
reducing production levels and the corresponding chemical 
applications was collected in the GCW survey in order to 
enumerate farmers' adoption probabilities for four government 
cost-share rates, 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%. Simulated net returns 
and potential pollution effects with regard to six N and five 
irrigation application alternatives in each of 17 years' weather data 
were then combined with the farmers' attitudes toward the cost-
share rates to generate randomized (weather and market) annual 
expectations of net returns and potential emission levels. 
Coefficients for the expectations of outcomes of the management 
alternatives were estimated from regressions of the expectations on 
the nitrogen, irrigation, and cost-share rates. Second-order Taylor 
series equations were used to approximate the nonlinearity of the 
expectation responses to the management alternatives. Regression 
results provided reasonable estimates of objective and constraint 
function parameters for the economic optimization of management 
alternatives. 
Given voluntary participation in a cost-sharing program for 
controlling agricultural nonpoint source pollution with irrigation 
management options, deterministic mathematical programming 
techniques can be used to optimize management practices and cost 
shares. The nonlinearities of the maximization problem required a 
nonlinear programming model approach. Formulating the problem 
using QP, the objective function was stated: 
Max: ENR(IRR, N, CS) , 
subject to: 
ESL(IRR, N, CS) 5. SL* , 
ENF(IRR, N, CS) 5. NF* , 
ENL(IRR, N, CS) 5_ NL* , and 
EGC(IRR, N, CS) GC* , 
where IRR represents irrigation treatments, N is nitrogen 
application rate, and CS the cost-share percentage. SL*, NF*, and 
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NL* are the target levels (restrictions) of soil loss, nitrogen runoff, 
and nitrogen leaching, respectively. GC* is the government cost 
share or the government budget constraint. GAMS (General 
Algebraic Modeling System)/MINOS (Murtagh and Saunders, 1987; 
Brooke et al., 1988) was used to solve the QP problem. 
RESULTS 
Baseline Model 
Given the cropping rotation modelled, an option using 122.7 kg/ha 
of N and supplemental irrigation triggered at 50% soil water content 
could increase farmers' average expected net returns (ENR) from 
$305.8/ha (under the current practice of 81.8 kg/ha N and non-
irrigation) to $648.3/ha, a 112% increase. Resultant soil losses 
would increase less than 0.4%. The N runoff would increase by 
0.11 kg/ha, or about 5.0%, while N leaching would increase by 8.9 
kg/ha, or 14.2%. If pollution effects could be ignored (that is, if the 
resultant effects were less than or equal to GCW area targets set for 
nonpoint pollution by the EPA), the potential profitability of this 
supplemental irrigation option is substantial. Simulated N leaching 
declines slightly from baseline when irrigating at the 20% water 
availability irrigation before increasing at higher irrigation rates. In 
contrast, the case of no irrigation and zero N fertilizer application 
found that N leaching could be reduced 18.1% and N runoff by 
2.3% from the baseline. Thus, agricultural sources of potential water 
quality degradation or enhancement could be altered only within a 
rather limited range of response by employing these fertilizer and 
irrigation management practices. 
Current pollution control targets, which would comprise a 
generally-acknowledged environmental criteria set, did not exist for 
comparison with the simulated soil and N pollution outputs. 
However, pollution control targets must be set in the analysis of 
management practices designed to reduce emissions. In the baseline 
model, the soil losses and N emission levels were restricted to levels 
less than or equal to the pollution levels corresponding to the 
management alternative with 122.7 kg/ha of N and a 50% water 
availability level. This option had the highest simulated ENR and 
was accompanied by a predicted soil loss of 12.68 t/ha, N runoff of 
2.30 kg/ha, and N leaching of 71.5 kg/ha. If the maximum 
government cost-share payment was limited to $0/ha (no payment) 
in the baseline solution, a farmer would obtain $644.28/ha net 
returns on peanut/corn crop land. Soil losses and N runoff and 
leaching remained equal to or below constrained levels, closely 
approximating the management alternative derived directly by 
simulation results. 
Sensitivity Analysis of BMPs 
We then modeled the economic sensitivity of pollution abatement 
and the corresponding cost-share programs over a range of 
management alternatives. Only one emission target or government 
cost constraint was changed in each scenario by a specific percentage 
from the baseline model, leaving other constraints unchanged (Table 
1). Optimization results showed that nitrogen leaching could be 
expected to be reduced by up to 10% from baseline results over the 
range of incentives tested. Soil losses and nitrogen runoff were quite 
inflexible with respect to abatement potential. The N fertilizer and 
irrigation applications, as well as farmers' ENRs, declined as stricter 
environmental criteria were imposed. 
Table 1 displays the predicted parameters of BMP alternatives 
for each additional 2.5%N leaching reduction. For example, when 
N leaching was reduced by 2.5% from the baseline model, the N 
fertilizer application must be reduced by 15.6 kg/ha. Irrigation 
triggering would drop from the 46.5% to 45.9% soil-water content. 
Farm ENR losses, after receiving the subsidy payment, 
approximated $3.75/ha. However, when N leaching was curtailed 
another 2.5%, N fertilizer must be further reduced by 18.2 kg/ha 
and the irrigation triggering level lowered by 0.8%. Further farm 
ENR losses were $5.88/ha for the additional 2.5% N leaching 
reduction from this lower initial level. 
With a federal budget restriction imposed at the current 
maximum of $12.50/ha, the government's cost-share rates 
decreased as stricter pollution criteria were imposed. 
Consequently, the farmers' ENRs also were reduced in the feasible 
scenarios. Thus the farmers' voluntary adoption rates declined. 
Assuming the budget restriction remained at $12.50/ha for the 
government's cost share, all QP solutions in Table I were feasible 
to farmers with no less than a 20% government cost-share rate. 
For example, if N leaching were to be reduced by 2.5%, 
government could share the cost of reduction at a 61.2% rate 
within the budget limitations and farmers could expect $643.23/ha 
net returns. However, if N leaching must be reduced by I O%, the 
government share covers only 36.1% of the expected losses, and 
the farmer's ENR would be reduced by $28.08/ha. Farmers' 
adoption probabilities would be reduced correspondingly. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The Gum Creek Watershed Pilot Cost-Sharing Project instituted 
an incentive-based program to abate nitrogen leaching and runoff 
from agricultural sources. Farmers' attitudes and potential and 
predicted responses to cost-sharing incentives are key to wider-
scale adoption of such a program. A pre-project survey of 
potential participants and an economic evaluation of management 
alternatives found that although voluntary participation improved 
with higher potential cost-sharing rates, nitrogen runoff and 
leaching effects were limited. 
Biophysical simulation and mathematical programming suggest 
that changes in supplemental irrigation management may offer 
more-profitable and less uncertain opportunities with little added 
impact on water quality. Irrigation and nitrogen fertilizer 
applications do not alter the water quality as much as generally 
anticipated, according to simulated results. However, decreasing 
nitrogen applications from currently advised rates sharply decreases 
farmers' expected net returns, voluntary participation, and has 
limited abatement potential. 
The costs of agricultural pollution abatement by reducing 
irrigation and/or nitrogen fertilizer application are high and 
increasing at the margin. Other nonagricultural sources or other 
agricultural practices, including restricting the cropland for peanuts 
in the rotation, appear to hold promise of significant water quality 
enhancement. Under limited government payments, pollution 
abatement significantly reduces farmers' net revenues. Hence, 
without increased threats of other regulatory means, more farmers 
would opt out of the program. This analytical framework provides 
critical decision-making information on the tradeoffs and burdens 
under variations of program implementation and can be applied to 
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other agricultural areas for prospective pollution abatement policies 
with regard to the same or other agricultural practices. 
LITERATURE CITED 
Boot; K.J., J.W. Jones, G. Hoogenboom, G.G. Wilkerson, and S.S. 
Jagtap. 1989. Peanut Crop Growth Simulation Model: User's 
Guide (V1.02). Florida Agricultural Experiment Station, Journal 
No. 8420. 
Brooke, A., D. Kendrick, and A. Meeraus. 1988. GAMS: A User's 
Guide. Redwood City, CA: The Scientific Press. 
GCES (Georgia Cooperative Extension Service). 1992a. 1993 
South Georgia Crop Enterprise Cost Analysis. CES/AAE/UGA. 
GCES. I 992b. USDA Demonstration Project Annual Report: 
Gum Creek Water Quality Project. CES, University of Georgia. 
Griffin, R.C. and D.W. Bromley. "Agricultural Runoff as a 
Nonpoint Externality: A Theoretical Development." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 64(1982): 547-52. 
Hook, James E. 1991. Water Withdrawals for Irrigation in Drought 
Years. ERC 03-91, The Coastal Plain Experiment Station, The 
University of Georgia. Tifton, Georgia. 
Knisel, W.G., F.M. Davis, and R.A. Leonard. 1992. GLEAMS 
Version 2.0: User Manual. Southeast Watershed Research 
Laboratory/ARS/USDA. Tifton, Georgia. 
Knisel, W.G., R.A. Leonard, F.M. Davis, and J.M. Sheridan. 
1991. Water Balance Components in the Georgia Coastal 
Plain: A GLEAMS Model Validation and Simulation. J. Soil 
and Water Cons. 46(6): 450-6. 
Murtagh, B.A., and M.A. Saunders. 1987. MINOS 5.1 User's 
Guide. Report SOL 83-20R, revised. Stanford, California_ 
Ritchie, J., U.Singh, D. Godwin, and L. Hunt. 1992. A User's 
Guide to CERES Maize - V2.10. 2nd ed. Michigan State 
University, IFDC & 1BSNAT. 
Smith, J. Owens. The Law of Surface Water Allocation in 
Georgia. Institute of Natural Resources, The University of 
Georgia in Cooperation with the Environmental Resources 
Center, Georgia Institute of Technology. ERC-578. Sept 
1978. 
Sun, Henglun. 1994. Economic Analysis of Water Quality 
Management in the Gum Creek Watershed Cost-Sharing 
Program. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, The University of 
Georgia, Athens, GA. 
Thomas, D.L., M.C. Smith, R.A. Leonard, and F.J.K. deSilva. 
1990. Simulated Effects of Rapeseed Production Alternatives 
on Pollution Potential in the Georgia Coastal Plain. J. Soil 
and Water Cons. 45(1): 148-54. 
Wright, Howell F. Jr. An Appraisal of Water Management 
Alternatives for the Flint River Basin. Unpublished Masters 
Thesis, University of Georgia, 1984. 
Table 1. Sensitivity of Expected Outcomes to Alternate Pollution Targets 
Constraint Changes from 
Baseline 











Soil 	Nitrogen 	Nitrogen 
Loss Runoff Leaching 




Soil Loss -0.1 13.7 124.3 20.0 95.7 99.9 99.9 100.0 8.95 
N Runoff -1.0 28.7 43.8 20.0 95.6 100.0 99.0 89.6 9.83 
N Leaching -2.5 45.9 109.9 61.2 99.8 100.0 99.9 97.5 12.50 
N Leaching -5.0 45.1 91.7 57.7 98.9 100.0 99.4 95.0 12.50 
N Leaching -7.5 39.6 73.8 51.1 97.5 100.0 99.4 92.5 12.50 
N Leaching -10.0 33.0 51.3 36.1 95.4 100.0 99.4 90.0 12.50 
*Note: 
	The expectations, except EGC (federal payment), are compared to the baseline solutions, simulated at 122.7 kg/ha of N and 
a 50% soil-water availability for irrigation. 
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